


State of New Hampshire

Emergency Operations Plan



Terrorism Annex

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Primary Agencies: Department of Justice/Attorney General
Department of Justice – Victim Advocate Services *
Department of Justice – Victim Compensation *
New Hampshire State Police
Department of Safety –BureauEmergency Management (BEM)

Shared Lead Agencies Department of Health and Human Services
Fire Marshal Office
Department of Agriculture
Department of Administrative Services, Division of Information Management.

Support Agencies State EOC Responding Agencies to Support Functional Activities (*Figure 2 of Basic Plan*)

* Terrorism Incidents only

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

1. This Terrorism Annex is to ensure that the New Hampshire Emergency Operations Plan (***State EOP***) is adequate to respond to threats of and acts of terrorism within the State. This document:
 - a. Defines response and recovery actions.
 - b. Generally describes operational procedures.
 - c. Defines Emergency Support Functions.
2. The State of New Hampshire will use established response and recovery policies, plans, and procedures/guides for both initial and continuing response and recovery actions at the local, State, and Federal levels.

B. Scope

1. This document applies to all threats or acts of terrorism that require response and recovery actions under the ***State EOP***.
2. It provides coordination between response and recovery agencies and will provide the necessary resources under the ***State EOP***. In order to properly address and manage all phases of a terrorist incident, the response and recovery efforts are its two components.

C. Structure

1. The Terrorism Annex to the *State EOP* is a compendium on the management of terrorist incidents. It focuses on the management of the event as well as linkage to the response and recovery actions to terrorist incident(s).
 - a. **Response actions** includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
 - 1) The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance, as required.
 - 2) Response actions are predominantly law enforcement oriented and address both initial and continuing actions associated with the terrorist event.
 - 3) Based on the situation and type of terrorist event, a State or a State/Federal initial and continuing response may be supported by state-designated shared lead agencies, technical operations, additional State and Federal assets, all of which may operate concurrently.
 - b. **Recovery actions** include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the terrorist event.
 - 1) The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond both initially and on a continuing basis to the recovery requirements of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.
 - 2) Recovery actions can and often do, operate concurrently with Response Actions. *Figure 1* illustrates the relationships between the two components and is based on a unified command or management organizational structure.




Figure 1 - The relationships between response and recovery action management

State Police
Attorney General

II. Terrorism Hazards

1. In conjunction with the NH National Guard, BEM has developed a threat and vulnerability database addressing each of the terrorism hazards identified in this section. The information contained in the database is considered law enforcement sensitive. Access to the information will be considered on a case-by-case, need to know basis.
2. ***Terrorism*** involves the use or threatened use of criminal violence against people, institutions, livestock, food sources or facilities to achieve a political or social objective through fear and intimidation, rather than direct confrontation. Unlike a disaster caused by nature or an accident involving hazardous materials, it requires the deliberate and premeditated action of a person or group to occur.
3. ***Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*** – Weapons of mass destruction are defined as any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; radiation or radioactivity; or explosion or fire. At least two important considerations distinguish these hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and medical technicians. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on battlefield exposures to WMD agents, there is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect civilian populations. They are described in law as:

- a. **Incendiary/Explosives** – The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Projectiles and missiles, including aircraft used against high-profile targets such as buildings, monuments, and special events, also can cause explosions and fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Historically, less than five percent of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little signature and are not readily detectable. Secondary explosive devices may also be used as weapons against responders and the public in coincident acts. Other diversionary events or attacks could also be aimed at responders.
- b. **Combined Hazards** – WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect – greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities.

- c. **Biological** – Recognition of a biological hazard can occur through several methods, including identification of a credible threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent, clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent), and detection (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data). When people are exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox, they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health community. Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local or even national economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning process. Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event. Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox, plague). Some indicators of biological attack are given in *Table 1*.

Stated Threat to Release a Biological Agent
Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals
Unusual Casualties <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unusual illness for region/area• Definite pattern inconsistent with natural disease
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Spraying; suspicious devices, packages, or letters

Table 1. General Indicators of Possible Biological Agent Use

- d. **Chemical** – Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate reaction from emergency responders—fire departments, police,

hazardous materials (HazMat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious consequences. Some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents are listed in **Table 2**. Early in an investigation, it may not be obvious whether an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical caused an outbreak; however, most chemical attacks will be localized, and their effects will be evident within a few minutes. There are both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical Agent
Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals <ul style="list-style-type: none">• For example, lack of insects, dead birds
Complaint of Product Tempering <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unexplained/Unusual odor• Unusual taste
Unexplained Casualties <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Multiple victims• Surge of similar 911 calls• Serious illnesses• Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, or convulsions• Definite casualty patterns
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Droplets, oily film• Unexplained odor• Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather
Suspicious Devices, Packages, or Letters <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unusual metal debris• Abandoned spray devices• Unexplained munitions

Table 2. General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use

- e. **Nuclear and radiological** – The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. In an explosion, the fact that radioactive material was involved may or may not be obvious, depending upon the nature of the explosive device used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain, unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and have been trained to use it properly. Although many detection devices exist, most are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for measuring or ruling out the presence of radiological hazards. **Table 3** lists some indicators of a radiological release.

Stated Threat to Deploy a Nuclear or Radiological Device
Presence of Nuclear or Radiological Equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spent fuel canisters or nuclear transport vehicles
Radiological Sickness Symptoms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Burns, nausea, hair loss
Nuclear Placards/Warning Materials Along with Otherwise
Unexplained Casualties

Table 3: General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological Agent Use

The scenarios constituting an intentional nuclear/radiological emergency include the following:

- 1) Use of an **improvised nuclear device (IND)** includes any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the type of trigger device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices. While “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency of a given device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.
- 2) Use of a **radiological dispersal device (RDD)** includes any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material upon detonation. By placing radiological material in close proximity, any improvised device could be used.
- 3) Use of a **simple RDD** that spreads radiological material without the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner.

- f. **Cyber-terrorism** – Cyber-terrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation’s critical infrastructures in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives (FBI NIPC, Congressional testimony, August 29, 2001). As with other critical infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on security measures to protect computer systems against intrusions, denial of service attacks, and other forms of attack rather than addressing issues related to contingency and consequence management planning.

Stated Threat of a Cyber-terrorism Attack
Detection of a Computer Virus by a Software Program
Unexplained Malfunctioning of a Computer Control System That Could Result in Injury or Death <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dam or Levy• 9-1-1 System• Streetlights• Air Traffic Control System
Collapse of Infrastructure Computer System <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Electric Power Grid• Nuclear Power Plant• Water Treatment Plant
Collapse of Vital Computer Databases <ul style="list-style-type: none">• NCIC

Table 4: General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack

- g. **Agro-terrorism** – Any terrorist act using biological agents, achieved by poisoning the food or water supplies or by introducing diseases among livestock. This can involve the use of chemical or biological agents.

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical/Biological Agent into the Agriculture Industry
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor or Powder
Unexplained Presence of Dead or Dying Animals, Birds and/or Insects
Presence of Abandoned Spray Devices

Table 5: General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack

4. **Other Terrorism Hazards** – Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every conceivable type of terrorist attack, it is anticipated that future terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex, sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for terrorist incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the unexpected. These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the consequences of attacks using low-tech devices and delivery, assaults on public infrastructure, and cyber terrorism. In these cases, the training and experience of the responders may be more important than detailed procedures.
- a. **Low-Tech Devices and Delivery** – Planning for the possibility of terrorist attacks must consider the fact that explosives can be delivered by a variety of methods. Most explosive and incendiary devices used by terrorists would be expected to fall outside the definition of a WMD. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public areas for later detonation, or they can be attached directly to a suicide bomber for detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist feels that maximum damage can be done. The relatively small size of these explosive devices and the absence of specific security measures in most areas make these types of terrorist attacks extremely difficult to prevent. Small explosive devices can also be brought onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand carried. Although present airline security measures minimize the possibility of explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider the level of security presently employed on ships, trains, and buses

within their jurisdictions. Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended target area by means of car or truck bombs.

- b. **Infrastructure Attacks** – Potential attacks on elements of the nation’s infrastructure require protective considerations. Infrastructure protection will involve proactive risk management actions to prevent the destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks and systems that serve our communities.
 - 1) Infrastructure protection often is more focused on security, deterrence, and law enforcement than on emergency preparedness and response. The State of New Hampshire’s departments and agencies must develop contingency plans in the event critical infrastructures are brought down as the result of a terrorist incident.
 - 2) Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued in May 1998. It established the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and outlined steps to be taken to protect critical infrastructures from disruptions that could have serious public health and safety, economic, or national security impacts.

A. Hazard Analysis and Assessment

- 1. An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the State of New Hampshire involving CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism, may produce major impacts that will overwhelm the capabilities of the State agencies almost immediately. Major impacts involving CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and or Agro-terrorism may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as well.
- 2. The target and intended consequences (loss of life, injury, property destruction/damage, disruption of services) will heavily influence the means (e.g. gun, fire, explosive, chemical or biological agents, etc.) chosen to carry out a terrorist act. To cause serious impact that overwhelms a local jurisdiction’s capability and requires State and Federal assistance, it is likely that the terrorist(s) will use a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).

III. Situation and Planning Assumptions

A. Situation

1. Until such time as an incident is determined to be an act of terrorism, response operations will be implemented under the *State EOP* and its ESF components.
2. A general concern or actual threat of an act of terrorism occurring at or during a special event within the State of New Hampshire may cause the Governor, as well as the President, to implement precautionary measures that may include some of the actions described in this Annex.
3. When directed, BEM will coordinate with the appropriate law enforcement and shared lead agencies to identify potential requirements and, if necessary, with FEMA to implement increased readiness operations.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal or private level possesses the authority and the expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism, particularly if CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism are involved.
2. Local, State, and Federal responders may define working perimeters that may overlap to some degree. Perimeters may be used to control access to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which may impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established.
3. If protective capabilities are not available, responders cannot be required to put their own lives at risk in order to enter a perimeter contaminated with CBRNE material. It is possible that the perimeter will be closed until the CBRNE agent is identified or the effects of the CBRNE material have degraded to levels that are safe for responders.
4. Although this annex takes into consideration the most probable scenarios relating to the primary categories of terrorism incidents, no assumptions should be made to the annex being all inclusive of every conceivable situation that a terrorism incident could create. Emergency responders will assess the situation and determine the best course of action based upon their training and prescribed policies, plans, and procedures.

IV. Concept of Operation

A. General

1. Response and Recovery actions to terrorist events will be conducted in accordance with established State policies, plans, procedures, and guides.
 - a. The Attorney General/NH State Police maintain the State's lead responsibility for response management to threats or acts of terrorism that take place within New Hampshire.
 - b. BEM has responsibility for all recovery actions throughout the State.
2. The *State EOP – Terrorism Annex* provides a graduated flexible response and recovery actions to the full range of incidents.
3. An act of terrorism exceeding the local capability to resolve automatically goes to the state level for assistance.

B. Organization

1. ***Functional Organization – Figure 2, State EOC Organization Chart***, details the overall response structure of the State EOC involving the threat of or actual occurrence of a terrorist incident in the State of New Hampshire. Direction and control remains the responsibility of the Governor's Office, with implementation and coordination conducted by BEM.
2. The Homeland Security Advisor, as the title indicates, will advise and provide guidance to the Governor or designee regarding the State's response to a potential threat or actual occurrence of a terrorist incident.
3. ***Interagency Coordination***

Under the Basic Plan of the *State EOP*, BEM is responsible to ensure that emergency response tasks/activities are coordinated among all the ESFs/response agencies and across all levels of government, as appropriate.
4. ***Specialized Teams/Units***
 - a. **NH National Guard WMD – Civil Support Team (CST)** – A team of Reservists and other military personnel

- b. **Regional HazMat Teams** – The State of New Hampshire has established 10 regional teams whose skills and resources could be used to mitigate the affects of a terrorist incident in the State.

5. ***Operational Facilities/Sites***

- a. **FBI – Joint Operations Center (JOC)** – A centralized operations center established by the FBI Field Office/Resident Agent during terrorism-related incidents to provide a single point of direction, control, and coordination for emergency response operations. The JOC resolves conflicts in prioritization of resource allocations involving Federal assets.
 - 1) The location of the JOC will be based upon the location of the incident and current threat specific information.
- b. **Joint Information Center (JIC)** - A combined public information center that serves two or more levels of government or Federal, State, and local agencies. During a terrorist incident, the FBI will establish and maintain this facility.

C. Warning

- 1. Every incident is different. There may or may not be warning of a potential WMD incident. Factors involved range from intelligence gathered from various law enforcement or intelligence agency sources to an actual notification from the terrorist organization or individual.
- 2. The warning or notification of a potential WMD terrorist incident could come from many sources; therefore, open but secure communication among local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and emergency response officials is essential.
- 3. The local FBI Field Office/Resident Agent will be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents in the State of New Hampshire.
- 4. The FBI will notify State and local law enforcement officials regarding potential terrorism threats.

D. Notification and Activation

- 1. Upon receiving information from the FBI of a potential terrorist threat, the NH State Police/Office of the Attorney General, based on the advise of the FBI, will notify the Homeland Security Advisor and the appropriate State agencies as the situation warrants.

2. The BEM will partially/fully activate the State EOC, based upon specific threat information received. The decision to partially/fully activate the EOC will be based on the advice of the Homeland Security Advisor for New Hampshire.
3. The State EOC will be fully activated upon the receipt of information that the US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS) has raised the threat level to **RED**.
4. In the event the threat level is raised to Orange, the EOC would be activated upon receipt of threat-specific information (e.g., governmental facilities are being targeted).
5. Based upon the information received, the BEM Director or Duty Officer will determine the operational level of the EOC and notify the Primary and/or Co-primary Agencies for each of the ESFs, as appropriate.
 - a. The Primary and/or Co-primary Agencies are then responsible for notifying the respective Support Agencies, as required and outlined in the Alert and Notification SOG for the ESF.

E. Communications

1. Communications and Alerting is tasked with the responsibility to establish and maintain a secure communications capability for the State, which includes voice, data, video, and fax.
2. Under the *State EOP* Communications and Alerting will coordinate measures to ensure communications interoperability among the response agencies.

F. Plan Implementation

1. ***Response Actions***
 - a. State Lead Agency assignment for Response Actions is the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Office of the Attorney General (AG) /NH State Police for general threats or acts of terrorism within the State of New Hampshire.
 - b. Response actions specific to certain types of terrorist acts can require a shared lead responsibility with additional State agencies, which have the skills and resources that can assist in defining, responding to, and managing the event. Such shared responsibilities would be:
 - 1) Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and food and product tampering terrorist acts the shared lead is with Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

- 2) Chemical, Incendiary and Explosive terrorist acts shared lead is the Department of Safety – Fire Marshal’s Office.
- 3) Agro-terrorist acts shared lead is the Department of Agriculture, Markets and Food.
- 4) Cyber-Terrorism shared lead is the Department of Administrative Services, Division of Information Management.

c. **Federal Actions**

- 1) Upon determining that a terrorist incident is credible, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), through the FBI Headquarters, will initiate liaison with other Federal agencies to activate their operations centers. The responsible FEMA region(s) may activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA region(s) activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI Field Office(s) to request a liaison. If the FBI activates the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters, then other Federal agencies, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the SIOC, as required. Once the FBI has determined the need to activate a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to support the incident site, Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested by FEMA to support the Consequence Management Group located at the JOC.

2. **Recovery Actions**

- a. BEM shall ensure that the *State EOP* is adequate to recover from the consequences of terrorism.
- b. BEM, with the support of all agencies in the *State EOP*, shall act in support of the response team, until such time as the Department of Justice/Attorney General/NH State Police shall transfer the Lead Agency role to BEM.
- c. BEM retains responsibility for recovery actions throughout the State response.
- d. It is the policy of BEM to use the *State EOP* structures to coordinate all State assistance to Federal, State, and local governments for recovery actions.

G. Incident Phases

1. *Pre-Incident*

- a. A credible or significant threat may be presented in verbal, written, intelligence-based or other form.
- b. In response to a credible or significant threat involving CBRNE/WMD/Cyber- or Agro-terrorism, the NH State Police and the Attorney General's Office initiates a threat assessment process that involves close coordination with State and Federal agencies with technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the threat from a technical, as well as tactical and behavioral standpoint.
- c. The NH State Police maintains contact listing of law enforcement, State and Federal agencies and provides the initial notification to other State law enforcement authorities, State agencies as well as the FBI of a threat or occurrence of terrorism.
- d. State requests for assistance from other State and Federal agencies will be coordinated through the State EOC. During the course of a threat assessment, consequences may become imminent or occur that cause the Governor to direct BEM to implement in part or in total the actions as described in this Annex.

2. *Trans-Incident (Situations involving a transition from a threat to an act of terrorism)*

- a. The NH State Police will contact State and Federal agencies and provides the initial notification to other State law enforcement authorities, state agencies as well as the FBI of the confirmed presence of an explosive device, WMD, Cyber- or Agro-terrorism threat, capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss (e.g., a significant threat).
- b. If an act of terrorism becomes imminent, and causes the Governor to direct BEM to implement a ***State EOP***, then BEM will initiate procedures to activate additional ESFs and a Disaster Field Office (DFO) if necessary). Coordination will be conducted from the designated State facility.
- c. As the situation warrants, the BEM Director will coordinate with the Governor or designee regarding the need to activate the State's Continuity of Operations (COOP) and/or Continuity of Government (COG) plans, as appropriate.

3. *Post-Incident*

- a. An incident is defined as follows:
 - 1) The detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in limited injury or death (e.g., limited consequences State and local response and recovery).
 - 2) Or the detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in substantial injury or death (e.g., major consequences / Federal response).
- b. Once an incident has occurred, BEM will provide a Liaison to the respective local EOC and/or the FBI JOC, as needed.
- c. The NH State Police will contact local, State, and Federal agencies of the detonation of an explosive device, using a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event.
- d. It is feasible to have recovery operations begin while response operations are continuing. BEM will coordinate with the appropriate local, State and Federal agencies in determining when recovery operations will commence. Recovery operations include, but are not limited to, the following activities/functions:
 - 1) Site Decontamination
 - 2) Site Demolition or Restoration
 - 3) Memorial Services
 - 4) Victim Compensation and Disaster Assistance
 - 5) Temporary Housing Assistance
 - 6) Long-term Medical Monitoring and Surveillance
- e. The NH State Police will coordinate with the FBI to determine the appropriate point at which, the scene will transition from the response and search and rescue phase to a criminal investigation phase.
- f. The NH State Police will coordinate with DOJ to initiate victim assistance programs, as appropriate.

4. *Deactivation*

- a. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the responding elements will deactivate when the BEM Director, in consultation with the NH State Police and the Governor, issues a cancellation notification to the appropriate ESF agencies. ESF agencies will coordinate with the EOC Operations Officer and deactivate according to establish SOPs/SOGs.
- b. If an act of terrorism occurs, then each ESF structure deactivates at the appropriate time according to established SOPs/SOGs. Following ESF deactivation, operations by individual State agencies may continue, in order to support the affected local governments with long-term hazard monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration

New Hampshire Operational Levels	Description	Associated State Actions	FBI Threat Levels	Associated Federal Actions
Normal Operations Low Condition (Green).	Consist of the daily operations agencies must carry out, in absence of an emergency situation, to ensure readiness.	Preparedness, planning, training, and exercise activities are being conducted.	Level 4 – Minimal Threat	Received threat does not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets on higher alert status.
Operation Level 1 Guarded Condition (Blue) Elevated Condition (Yellow)	Monitoring phase triggered by the potential for an event that could threaten life, property, or the environment.	State agencies and ESFs that would need to take action, as part of their everyday responsibilities will be notified. The EOC will be staffed with ESF personnel.	Level 3 – Potential Threat	Intelligence indicates potential for terrorist incident, but not deemed credible.
Operation Level 2 High Condition (Orange)	Partial activation of the EOC. Triggered by highly probable hazardous conditions and a strong potential for property damage or loss of life.	All ESF primary agencies are notified. The EOC is staffed with assigned personnel and the necessary ESFs.	Level 2 – Credible Threat	Confirms involvement of WMD in developing terrorist incident. State and local law enforcement notified. Federal assets pre-deployed as required.
Operation Level 3 Severe Condition (Red)	Full activation of the EOC. Triggered by extremely hazardous conditions that are imminent or occurring. Highest state of alert.	All primary and support agencies under the <i>State EOP</i> are notified. The EOC will be on full activation with 24-hour staffing by assigned personnel and all necessary ESFs.	Level 1 – Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident	Federal resources deployed to augment State and local operations, JOC/JIC activated, EOC fully activated, State liaisons in JOC/JIC as required, Unified Command established.

Figure 2 - Alignment of Operational Levels with FBI Threat Levels

H. Roles and Responsibilities

1. The New Hampshire DOJ/AG is a primary agency to implement and coordinate the response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:
 - a. Lead agency for coordination of DOJ Grant Programs.
 - b. Serves as the primary state agency for criminal activity, investigations, and prosecution.
 - c. Works closely with DOJ, FBI, and State Police with respect to terrorist acts.
 - d. Provides liaison personnel to the State EOC at terrorist incidents.
2. The New Hampshire State Police is a primary agency in implementing and coordinating response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:
 - a. Coordinating the statewide threat assessment.
 - b. Working closely with the FBI in assessing threats.
 - c. Assisting the FBI with crime scene management.
 - d. Serving as the lead agency for ordinance control and mitigation.
 - e. Participating in EOC/ESF operations, as outlined in the ***State EOP***.
 - f. Implementing Response Actions (Attorney General, State Police).
 - 1) During the response, the NH State Police coordinates closely with local law enforcement authorities and other State agencies for law enforcement resolution.
 - 2) If Federal agencies are involved, then the State Police also coordinates with them. State Police are responsible for the incident site and may modify its Command Post to function as a Joint Operations Center (JOC).
 - 3) The JOC structure includes the following standard groups:
 - a) Command
 - b) Operations
 - c) Support
 - d) Recovery
 - 4) Representation within the JOC may include Federal, State, and local agencies with support roles. Selected Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested to serve in the JOC Command Group, the JOC Support group/Media component, and the JOC Recovery Management Group (see ***Figure 3***, shaded area).

- 5) To maintain consistency in the management of the incident the JOC should continue to operate as structured, however, leadership of the JOC may pass to FBI dependent on the situation. State Police and state agencies in support of the JOC will continue to operate, but under FBI role designation and direction.
- 6) Response issues that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the FBI and the JOC Command Group working in consultation with local, State and Federal representatives. While the FBI on-scene commander (OSC) retains authority to make Federal response decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible.
- 7) The FBI OSC and the senior FEMA official will provide, or obtain resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources between response and recovery requirements.




Figure 3 - Joint Operations Center Structure

3. BEM is the primary agency to implement and coordinate recovery functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:
 - a. Coordinates consequence management activities at the State level.
 - b. Activate **State EOP** and designated ESFs.
 - c. Deploy a State Liaison to the local EOC.
 - d. Works closely with FEMA and other Federal agencies for impact services.
 - e. Based on the circumstances, the State EOC with specifically requested ESFs maybe activated and the **State EOP** implemented to support the situation. BEM and other State agencies as needed maybe deployed to the State EOC to provide assistance.
 - f. If the State EOC is operational, and the situation progresses with community impact becoming imminent, then the BEM Operations Officer may request a liaison from the response management group be present to ensure adequate communications are maintained throughout the incident.
 - g. If an incident occurs without warning that produces major community impact and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, then BEM and the NH State Police will initiate required actions concurrently. BEM will consult immediately with the Governor's office to determine an appropriate course of action and if Federal assistance is required. If the Governor directs BEM to implement the **State EOP**, then BEM will implement portions of this attachment and other ESFs as required. BEM will support the Response Management Team, as required.
4. **Emergency Support Functions Specific to Terrorism Response**
 - a. **General**
 - 1) Upon activation of **State EOP** (either in whole or in part), State agencies/organizations designated as a Primary, Co-primary, and/or Support Agency for the ESFs will effectively carry out their missions and assigned roles and responsibilities, as requested.
 - 2) All of the ESFs will provide support within the scope of their agencies' statutory authority and assigned mission.
 - 3) This section only outlines those ESFs that have roles and responsibilities specific to a response to terrorism incident.

These roles and responsibilities are in addition to those outlined in the Basic Plan and ESF-specific components of the *State EOP*.

b. Communications and Alerting

- 1) Establish and maintain a secure communications capability to include voice, video, data, and fax.
- 2) Establish and maintain the security and integrity of the State's Information Technology (IT) infrastructure.

c. Fire Fighting

- 3) Coordinate additional assistance and resources from unimpacted jurisdictions to include but not limited to the following:
 - a) Detection and monitoring equipment
 - b) Decontamination equipment and supplies

d. Mass Care and Shelter

- 1) Coordinate with, Law Enforcement and Security regarding the following:
 - a) Victim interviews
 - b) Information and/or description of perpetrator

e. Health and Medical Services

- 1) Coordinate the provision of decontamination assistance to hospitals, first responders and, when necessary, private facilities.
- 2) Assist in the overall management, response, and recovery of terrorist incidents involving radiological materials, to include:
 - a) Detection, recovery, and disposal of on-scene radioactive debris
 - b) Identification of isotope(s)
 - c) Plume projections
 - d) Recommendations on protective actions

- e) Determination of health risk/consequences to the public and first responders.
- 3) Assume the lead State role in the response and recovery of a biological terrorist incident, to include:
 - a) Disease control and prevention.
 - b) Epidemiological investigation.
 - c) Quarantine and isolation.
 - d) Identification of the biological agent.
 - e) Secure laboratory services.
 - f) Dispersal of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
 - g) Management of immunization clinics.
- 4) Assist the Medical Examiner's Office in the proper disposition of contaminated human remains, clothing and miscellaneous items, as needed.
- 5) Assist in the efforts to ensure there is no uptake of chemical, radiological or biological agents into the food chain or the food supply.
- 6) Develop and implement the following supplemental documents to the *State EOP*:
 - a) Bio-terrorism Annex.
 - b) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and Point of Distribution (POD) plans and procedures.
 - c) Mass Prophylaxis Plan.
- 7) Implement the Smallpox Vaccination Plan, as appropriate.
- 8) Implement the Influenza Pandemic Plan, as appropriate.
- f. **Hazardous Materials**
 - 1) Establish decontamination of contaminated victims and emergency response personnel.
 - 2) Provide detection and monitoring services, equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE), as needed.
 - 3) Establish and maintain environmental health hazards remediation, as needed.

g. Energy

Establish and maintain the security and integrity of the State's Energy infrastructure.

h. Law Enforcement and Security

- 1) Disseminate threat information with designated ESFs and other State agencies/organizations, as appropriate.
- 2) Provide training to emergency response personnel (to include hospital personnel) that includes but is not limited to the following:
 - a) Crime scene preservation.
 - b) Evidence collection and chain of custody.
 - c) Victim interviews.
 - d) Combined epidemiological/criminal investigations.
- 3) Coordinate with Communications and Alerting regarding tracing/investigating Cyber-terrorist attacks and securing affecting sites.
- 4) Coordinate with Hazardous Materials to ensure scene safety, as needed.
- 5) Coordinate with Mass Care and Shelter to provide information about a potential perpetrator of a terrorist incident.
- 6) Coordinate with Health and Medical Services regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for bioterrorism, nuclear, and radiological terrorism incidents.
- 7) Coordinate with Animal Health regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for incidents involving Agro-Terrorism.
- 8) Coordinate with the Department of Justice – Victim Advocate Services, to provide assistance and support to victims of a terrorist incident.
- 9) Coordinate with the Department of Justice – Victim Compensation, to provide monetary assistance to victims of a terrorist incident.

i. **Public Information**

- 1) Serve as primary public information source until event is classified as a terrorist act and media releases are assumed by Joint Operations Center (JOC) Media operations.
- 2) Liaison with the JOC Media/Public Information Officer (PIO) and assist as needed/directed regarding the collection and dissemination of public information.
- 3) Assist JOC in keeping media and public informed through JOC designated and approved briefings and press conferences.
- 4) Transition to the PIO/JIC operations to the FBI JIC, as required.

j. **Animal Health**

- 1) Assess the scope, magnitude, and extent of the CBRNE/Agro-Terrorism incident.
- 2) Implement plans and procedures to prevent, contain, and/or mitigate the chemical, biological, or radiological agent introduced into the agricultural and livestock environment.
- 3) In the event, an Agro-Terrorism incident involves a zoonotic disease, coordinate with Health and Medical Services to address the public health risks and for the dissemination of emergency public health information/personal protective actions that may be necessary.
- 4) Coordinate with Hazardous Materials to ensure safe entry to the incident site, as necessary.
- 5) Coordinate with Law Enforcement and Security regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations, as needed.

B. Interagency Coordination

1. The EOC is the focal point for interagency and intergovernmental coordination between the following:
 - a. **FBI JOC**
 - b. **Other Law Enforcement Command Posts**
 - c. **Other Local EOCs**
 - d. **FEMA IOF / DFO**
2. **Figure 4** illustrates the coordination relationships that will be involved during response operations.




Figure 4. Interagency Coordination Relationships

V. Authorities & References

G. Plans

1. *New Hampshire State Emergency Operations Plan.*
2. *New Hampshire Planning and Disaster Reference.*
3. *New Hampshire Radiological Protection (Hazard Specific Annex).*
4. *New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)*
5. *New Hampshire Hazardous Materials Annex.*
6. *Rapid Needs Assessment Team (RNAT) Plan.*
7. *The Federal Response Plan, April 1992.*
8. *The Regional Response Plan, March 1994.*
9. *New Hampshire Emergency Alert System (EAS) Operational Plan.*
10. *Presidential Decision Directive 39 (classified). An unclassified extract maybe obtained from FEMA.*
11. *FBI Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (classified). An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.*
12. *FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan (classified). An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.*
13. *DHHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological (C/B) Terrorism.*

H. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) Standard Operating Procedures/Guides

1. *New Hampshire State Coordinating Officer Handbook.*
2. *New Hampshire Initial Assessment Team (IAT) Handbook.*
3. *New Hampshire Guidelines for Recovery Operations.*
4. *New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management Duty Officer Handbook.*
5. *PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines (classified).*
6. *Alert and Notification SOG.*
7. *Activation and Deactivation SOG.*
8. *Position Checklists.*
9. *Position Descriptions.*
10. *Secure Communications Procedures.*
11. *Emergency Alert System (EAS).*
12. *Federal-State Interoperability SOG.*
13. *Emergency Personnel Contact SOP.*

VI. Attachments

Forms

1. *Chronological Event Log*
2. *Incident Report*
3. *Status Report*
4. *Message Form*
5. *BEM Emergency Shift Change*
6. *State Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) Shift Schedule*
7. *Federal / State Point of Contact Worksheet*

NOTE: All forms are bound separately and are located in the State EOC.